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Abstract
JSConTest introduced the notions of effect monitoring and dynamic
effect inference for JavaScript. It enables the description of effects
with path specifications resembling regular expressions. It is imple-
mented by an offline source code transformation.
To overcome the limitations of the JSConTest implementation,
we redesigned and reimplemented effect monitoring by taking ad-
vantange of JavaScript proxies. Our new design avoids all draw-
backs of the prior implementation. It guarantees full interposition;
it is not restricted to a subset of JavaScript; it is self-maintaining;
and its scalability to large programs is significantly better than with
JSConTest.
The improved scalability has two sources. First, the reimple-
mentation is significantly faster than the original, transformation-
based implementation. Second, the reimplementation relies on the
fly-weight pattern and on trace reduction to conserve memory. Only
the combination of these techniques enables monitoring and infer-
ence for large programs.
Categories and Subject Descriptors D.3.3 [PROGRAMMING
LANGUAGES]: Language Constructs and Features—Classes and
objects; D.3.3 [SOFTWARE ENGINEERING]: Software/Program
Verification—Programming by contract,Validation; D.4.6 [OP-
ERATING SYSTEMS]: Security and Protection—Access controls
General Terms Design, Languages, Security, Verification
Keywords Access Permission Contracts, JavaScript, Proxies
1. Introduction
JSConTest [22] introduced the notions of effect monitoring and dy-
namic effect inference [23] for JavaScript. It enables the program-
mer to specify the effect of a function using access permission con-
tracts. These contracts consist of an anchor specifying a start object
∗ This report is a slightly edited versions of the paper appeared in the Pro-
ceedings of the 9th symposium on Dynamic languages. To avoid confusions
we revised the notation of access permission contracts. Further, we split the
theorem of Syntactic derivative of contracts.
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and a regular expression specifying the admissible access paths that
a contract-annotated function may use. Matching paths can be as-
signed read or write permission.
The inference component of JSConTest may help a software
maintainer who wants to investigate the effect of an unfamiliar
function by monitoring its execution and then summarizing the
observed access traces to access permission contracts.
JSConTest is implemented by an offline source code transfor-
mation. This approach enabled a quick development, but it comes
with a number of drawbacks. First, it requires a lot of effort to
construct an offline transformation that guarantees full interposi-
tion and that covers the full JavaScript language: the implemented
transformation has known omissions (e.g., no support for with and
prototypes) and it does not apply to code created at run time using
eval or other mechanisms. Second, the transformation is subject
to bitrotting because it becomes obsolete as the language evolves.
Third, the implementation represents access paths with strings and
checks them against the specification using the built-in regular ex-
pression matching facilities of JavaScript. This approach quickly
fills up memory with many large strings and processes the match-
ing of regular expressions in a monolithic way.
In this work, we present JSConTest2, a redesign and reim-
plementation of JSConTest using JavaScript proxies [14, 43], a
JavaScript extension which is scheduled for the upcoming EC-
MAScript 6 standard. This new implementation addresses all short-
comings of the previous version. First, the proxy-based implemen-
tation guarantees full interposition for the full language and for all
code regardless of its origin, including dynamically loaded code
and code injected via eval. Second, maintenance is alleviated be-
cause there is no transformation that needs to be adapted to changes
in the language syntax. Also, future extensions are catered for as
long as the proxy API is supported. By adapting ideas from code
contracts [16], we also avoided a custom syntax extension. Third,
our new implementation represents access paths in a space efficient
way. It also incrementalizes the path matching by encoding its state
in an automaton state, which is represented by a regular expression.
It applies the fly-weight pattern to reduce memory consumption of
the states. Last but not least, the new implementation is signifi-
cantly faster than the previous one.
JSConTest2 employs Brzozowski’s derivatives of regular ex-
pressions [10] to perform the path matching incrementally and effi-
ciently. It applies a rewriting system inspired by Antimirov’s tech-
niques [2] for deciding subset constraints for regular expressions to
simplify regular expressions if more than one contract is applied to
an object at the same time.
To evaluate the scalability of JSConTest2, we applied path mon-
itoring to a number of example programs including web page
dumps. The main problem we had to deal with was excessive
memory use. We explain several techniques for reducing memory
consumption, including the reduction of regular expression based
effect contracts using an adaptation of Antimirov’s techniques.
Contributions
• Reimplementation of JSConTest using JavaScript proxies
• Formalization of violation logging and contract enforcement
• Reduced memory use by simplification of regular expressions
• Practical evaluation with case studies
Overview Section 2 gives some examples and rationales for JS-
ConTest2. Section 3 gives a high-level overview of the approach
taken in this paper. Section 4 recalls proxies and membranes from
related work. Section 5 defines the syntax of access paths and ac-
cess contracts. Section 6 formalizes a core language and defines
the semantics for path logging and contract enforcement. Section 7
explains the techniques used to reduce memory consumption. Sec-
tions 8 and 9 describe the implementation and some experiences
in applying JSConTest2. Section 10 discusses related work. It is
followed by a conclusion.
Appendix A and B shows the formal semantics for violations
and merged proxies. Section C states some auxiliary functions
used. The proofs of semantic containment, syntactic, derivative,
syntactic containment, and correctness are shown in the appendix
D, E, F, and G.
2. Effects for JavaScript
JavaScript is the language of the Web. More than 90% of all Web
pages provide functionality using JavaScript. Most of them rely
on third-party libraries for calenders, social networks, or feature
extensions. Some of these libraries are statically included with the
main script, others are loaded dynamically.
Software development and maintenance is tricky in JavaScript
because dynamically loaded libraries have arbitrary access to the
application state. Some libraries override global objects to add
features, others manipulate data stored in the browser’s DOM or in
cookies, yet others may send data to the net. In addition, there are
security concerns if the application has to guarantee confidentiality
or integrity of data. As all scripts run with the same authority, the
main script has no handle on the use of data by an included script.
As all resources in a JavaScript program are accessible via prop-
erty read and write operations, controlling those operations is suf-
ficient to control the resources. Thus, effect monitoring and infer-
ence have a role to play in the context of test-driven development,
in maintenance to analyze a piece of software, or in security to pre-
vent the software from compromising confidentiality or integrity.
JSConTest2 monitors read and write operations on objects
through access permission contracts that specify allowed effects as
outlined in the introduction. A contract restricts effects by defining
a set of permitted access paths starting from some anchor object.
2.1 Contracts and the Contract API
This section introduces the contract syntax and the JSConTest2
API. In a first example, a developer may want to ascertain that only
some parts of an object are accessed.
1 var p r o t e c t e d =
2 APC . permit ( ’ ( a . ?+ b∗ ) ’ , {a :{ a : 3 , b : 5} , b :{ a : 7 , b : 1 1}} ) ;
Here, APC is the object that encapsulates the JSConTest2 im-
plementation. Its permit method takes a contract and an object as pa-
rameters and returns a “contracted” object where only access paths
that are explicitly permitted by the contract are admitted. The con-
tract consists of two alternative parts connected by +. The first part,
’a .?’ , gives read/write access to all properties of the object in the a
property, but a itself is read-only. The second part, ’b∗’, allows read
and write access to an arbitrarily long chain of properties named b.
Here is an example with some uses of the contracted object.
1 var x = APC . permit ( ’ a . b ’ , {a :{ b : 3} , b :{b : 5}} ) ;
2 y = x . a ;
3 y . b = 3 ;
The access permission contract ’a.b’ specifies the singleton set
{a.b} of permitted access paths. The contract allows us to read and
write property a .b and to read the prefix a. Properties which are
not addressed by a contract are neither readable nor writeable. The
read and write operations in lines 2 and 3 abide by the contract, but
reading from x.b or writing to x.a would not be permitted and would
cause a violation.
Only the last property of a path in the set of permitted access
paths is writeable and all prefixes are readable. The special property
@ stands for a “blank” property that matches no other property.
Using it at the end of a contract specifies a read-only path as shown
in the following example.
1 var x = APC . permit ( ’ a . b .@’ , {a :{b : 3} , b :{ b : 5}} ) ;
2 x . a . b = 3 ; // violation
One could imagine contracts for defining write-only paths, for
instance, in a security context. This case is not covered by our im-
plementation, but it would be straightforward to provide an inter-
face that separates read and write permissions.
The next example demonstrates how contracts interact with
assignments.
1 var x = APC . permit ( ’ ( ( a+a . b )+b . b .@) ’ , {a :{ b : 3} , b :{ b : 5}} ) ;
2 x . a = x . b ;
3 x . a . b =7 ; // violation
The contract ’(( a+a.b)+b.b.@)’ allows read access to x.b and x.b.b
as well as read and write access to x.a and x.a .b. Reading x.b
yields a contracted object {b:5} with contract ’b.@’, where b is
read-only. This object is assigned to x.a so that x.a and x.b are
now aliases. The strategy of JSConTest2 is to obey the contracts
along all access paths. Reading x.a again yields an object with
contract ’( e+b)&b.@’, where e stands for the empty word and & is
the conjunction operator. Thus, the resulting contract ’( e+b)&b.@’
simplifies to ’b.@’ such that writing to x.a .b causes a violation.
In addition to using full property names in contracts, the syntax
admits regular expressions for property names, too. For example,
the contract ’(/ˆ get .+/+next)∗. length .@’ allows us to read the length
property after reading a chain of properties that either start with get
or that are equal to next.
2.2 A Security Example
As an example from a security context, consider the following
scenario, which was used as an exploit to extract the contacts out
of a GMail account.1
1 <s c r i p t type="text/javascript"
2 s r c="http://docs.google.com/data/contacts?out=js&
3 show=ALL&psort=Affinity&callback=google&max=99999">
4 </ s c r i p t>
This script element is a JSONP request that loads the Google
Mail contacts and sends it to the google function, which is given as
callback. The following listing shows what the data given to the
callback function could look like.
1 var c o n t a c t s = {
2 S u c c e s s : t r u e ,
3 E r r o r s : [ ] ,
4 Body : {
5 AuthToken : {
1 This exploit has been fixed in 2006.
6 Value : ’∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ’
7 } ,
8 C o n t a c t s : [
9 {
10 Name : ’ Jimmy Example ’ ,
11 Email : ’ email@example . org ’ ,
12 Addres s e s : [ ] ,
13 Phones : [ ] ,
14 Ims : [ ]
15 } ,
16 // More contacts
17 ]
18 }
19 } ;
To restrict access to the contacts object, the developer could wrap
it into a contract as follows.
1 re turn APC . permit (
2 ’ ( ( Succes s .@+Errors . ?∗ )+ Body . Contac ts . ? . Name) ’ ,
3 c o n t a c t s ) ;
This contract enables read access to Success (’Success.@’), read-
/write access to everything below Errors (’Errors.?∗’). Furthermore,
only the Name propertiy can be accessed on each element of the con-
tacts array Body.Contacts. Access to the properties AuthToken as well as
to the actual contact data (e.g., Email, Phones, Ims) is not permitted,
thus substantially diminishing the value of an exploit.
In this case, an access permission contract should restrict the
google function from using its argument arbitrarily. To be effec-
tive, a HTTP proxy would have to insert the contract in the HTTP
request resulting from the script tag.
1 var goog le = APC . permitArgs ( ’ arguments . 0 .
2 ( ( Succes s .@+Errors . ?∗ )+ Body . Contac ts . ? . Name) ’ ,
3 f u n c t i o n ( c o n t a c t s ) {
4 // do something
5 } ) ;
The permitArgs method takes an access permission contract and
a function and returns a wrapped function, such that each call to the
wrapped function enforces the contract. Arguments are addressed
by position so that ’arguments.0’ addresses the first argument. The
remaining contract specification is as before.
Because of the transparent implementation of contract enforce-
ment, the function that is wrapped is arbitrary: it may be defined
in the same source, it may be loaded dynamically, or it may be the
result of eval. Contract enforcement works in all cases.
3. The JSConTest2 Approach
JSConTest2 implements a contracted target object by wrapping it in
a proxy object that intercepts all operations on the target and either
forwards them to the target or signals a contract violation. The
monitoring requires storing a set of access paths and the contract
along with the proxy. When reading a property of a contracted
object that contains another object, then the read operation must
return a contracted object that carries the remaining contract after
the read operation (cf. the examples in Section 2.1). This “contract
inheritance” is an instance of the membrane pattern that is often
used in connection with proxies. Section 4 gives an introduction to
proxies and membranes.
As contracts are closely related to regular expressions, the re-
maining contract after a read operation can be nicely characterized
using Brzozowski-derivatives of regular expressions. Section 5 for-
mally defines contracts and their semantics in terms of access paths,
it defines the derivative operation on contracts, establishes its basic
properties, and finishes by defining readable and writeable paths.
This section form the basis for Section 6, which formalizes the se-
mantics of the permit operations.
Section 7 addresses some practical problems that arise from the
implementation. Under certain circumstances, the same object may
Meta-Level
Base-Level
Handler h.get(t, ’foo’, p);
h.set(t, ’bar’, 4711, p);
Proxy
p.foo;
p.bar=4711 Target
t[’foo’];
t[’bar’]=4711
Figure 1. Example of proxy operation.
Path: P
Contract: C Proxy
Path: P.p
Contract: ∂p(C) Proxy
p
b
b[p]
p
Figure 2. Example of property access through membrane.
be subject to multiple contracts. A naive implementation would
create an inefficient chain of proxy objects, which can be avoided
by merging the path set and contract information. However, these
merge operations themselves lead to memory bloat, which can be
addressed by using suitable data structures and aggressive contract
simplification.
4. Proxies and Membranes
4.1 Proxies
A JavaScript proxy [14] is an object whose behavior is controlled
by a handler object. A typical use case is to have the handler
mediate access to an arbitrary target object, which may be a native
or proxy object. The proxy is then intended to be used in place of
the target and is not distinguishable from other objects. However,
the proxy may modify the original behavior of the target object in
many respects.
The handler object defines trap functions that implement the
operations on the proxy. Operations like property lookup or prop-
erty update are forwarded to the corresponding trap. The handler
may implement the operation arbitrarily; in the simplest case, it
forwards the operation to the target object. The handler may also
be a proxy.
Figure 1 contains a simple example, where the handler h causes
the proxy p to behave as a wrapper for a target object t. Performing
the property access p.foo on the proxy object results in a meta-
level call to the corresponding trap on the handler object h. Here,
the handler forwards the property access to the target object. The
property write is handled similarly.
4.2 Membranes
Our technique to implement objects under a contract is inspired
by Revocable Membranes [14, 37, 43]. A membrane serves as a
regulated communication channel between an object and the rest
of the program. It ensures that all parts of the objects behind a
membrane also remain behind. For example, each property access
on a wrapped object (e.g. obj.p) returns another wrapped object.
Therefore, after wrapping, no new direct references to target objects
behind the membrane become available. One use of this mechanism
Literal ∋ ℓ ::= @ (empty literal)
| ? (universe)
| r (regular expression)
| !r (negation)
Contract ∋ C ::= ∅ (empty set)
| E (empty contract)
| ℓ (literal)
| C∗ (Kleene star)
| C+C (logical or)
| C&C (logical and)
| C.C (concatenation)
Figure 3. Syntax of access permission contracts.
is to revoke all references to an object network or to enforce write
protection [14, 37, 43].
In our use of membranes (cf. Figure 2), each handler contains
a path P , and a contract C describing the allowed field accesses.
Each property access obj.p on a wrapped object returns a wrapped
object whose path is P .p. In addition, the handler traps enforce the
contract C. If the access on property p is allowed by contract C
the handler forwards the request to the target object and wraps the
returned object with the new contract ∂p(C), which is the derivative
of C with respect to p (explained in Section 5.3). If this access is
not allowed, then the handler prevents it in a configurable way.
The Figure 2 shows a membrane arising from an allowed prop-
erty access. The information on the left is contained in the handler
objects and the objects inside the membrane on the right are the tar-
get objects of the proxies. Thus, our implementation logs all access
paths to wrapped objects in their handlers.
5. Access Permission Contracts
This section defines the syntax and semantics of access permission
contracts and access paths.
5.1 Access Paths
Let A be a set of property names and ι /∈ A be a special blank
property that does not occur in any JavaScript object. Its sole
purpose is to indicate read-only accesses. Let p ∈ A ∪ {ι} range
over all properties. An access path P ∈ (A ∪ {ι})∗ is a sequence
of properties. We write ǫ for the empty path and P .P for the
concatenation of two paths (considered as sequences).
5.2 Contracts
Figure 3 defines the syntax of contracts. Contract literals ℓ are the
primitive building blocks of contracts. Each literal defines a prop-
erty access. A literal ℓ is either the empty literal @, the universe
literal ?, a regular expression r, or a negated regular expression !r.
The empty literal @ stands for the blank property ι. It should not
be confused with the empty set contract ∅. The universe literal ?
represents the set of all JavaScript property names. A regular ex-
pression r describes a set of matching property names. We assume
that these expressions are JavaScript regular expressions, which we
treat as abstract in this work.
Contracts are regular expressions extended with intersection. A
contract C is either an empty set ∅, an empty contract E , a single
literal ℓ, a Kleene star C∗, a disjunction C+C, a conjunction C&C,
or a concatenation C.C. Beware that a literal may contain a regular
expression at the character level.
Each contract defines a set of access paths as defined in Figure 4.
This definition follows the usual semantics of regular expressions
with a few specialities. The empty literal yields the empty property.
LJ@K = {ι}
LJ?K = A
LJrK = {p | r ≻ p}
LJ!rK = A\LJrK
LJ∅K = {}
LJEK = {ǫ}
LJC∗K = {ǫ} ∪ LJC.C∗K
LJC+C′K = LJCK ∪ LJC′K
LJC&C′K = LJCK ∩ LJC′K
LJC.C′K = {P .P ′ | P ∈ LJCK,P ′ ∈ LJC′K}
Figure 4. Language of contracts.
E∗  E
E .C  C
@.C  @
∅.C  ∅
∅+C  C
@+C  C
C+C  C
∅&C  ∅
@&C  @
C&C  C
Figure 5. Normalization rules for contracts.
A is the set of all property names. r ≻ p is a predicate that indicates
whether property p matches regular expression r (as a standard
regular expression on characters).
We say that the contract literal ℓ matches property p, written as
ℓ < p, iff p ∈ LJℓK. We further say that a contract C matches path
P , written C < P , iff P ∈ LJCK.
The last property p of an access path P .p is readable and
writeable. All properties along the prefixP are readable. A contract
ending with the empty literal C.@ is a read-only contract. It matches
access paths of the form P .ι that end with the blank property ι,
which never occurs in a program.
Figure 5 contains normalization rules for contracts. We say that
a contract C is normalized iff it cannot be further reduced by these
rules. From now on, we regards all contracts as normalized.
5.3 Derivatives of Contracts
In this section we introduce the notion of a derivative for a contract,
which is defined analogously to the derivative of a regular expres-
sion [10, 39]. Derivatives are best explained in terms of a language
quotient, which is the set of suffixes of words in the language after
taking away a prescribed prefix.
Definition 1 (Left quotient). Let L ⊆ A∗ be a language. The left
quotient P−1L of the language L with respect to an access path P
is defined as:
P−1L = {P ′ | P .P ′ ∈ L} (1)
Clearly, it holds that {P .P ′ | P ′ ∈ P−1L} ⊆ L. It is also
immediate from the definition that (p.P)−1L = P−1(p−1L).
To compute the derivative of a contract C w.r.t. an access path P
we have to introduce an auxiliary function ν to determine if a con-
tract C matches the empty path ǫ. Figure 6 contains its definition.
Definition 2 (Nullable). A contract C is nullable iff its language
LJCK contains the empty access path E .
Lemma 1 (Nullable).
E ∈ LJCK ⇔ ν(C) = ⊤ (2)
If we access a target object by reading property p on an ob-
ject with contract C, then the access language for the target ob-
ν(@) = ⊥
ν(?) = ⊥
ν(r) = ⊥
ν(!r) = ⊥
ν(∅) = ⊥
ν(E) = ⊤
ν(C∗) = ⊤
ν(C+C′) = ν(C) ∨ ν(C′)
ν(C&C′) = ν(C) ∧ ν(C′)
ν(C.C′) = ν(C) ∧ ν(C′)
Figure 6. The predicate “is nullable”.
∂p(@) = ∅
∂p(?) = E
∂p(r) =
{
E , r ≻ p
∅, otherwise
∂p(!r) =
{
∅, r ≻ p
E , otherwise
∂p(∅) = ∅
∂p(E) = ∅
∂p(C∗) = ∂p(C).C∗
∂p(C+C
′) = ∂p(C)+∂p(C
′)
∂p(C&C
′) = ∂p(C)&∂p(C
′)
∂p(C.C
′) =
{
∂p(C).C
′+∂p(C
′), ν(C)
∂p(C).C
′, otherwise
Figure 7. Derivative of a contract by a property.
ject is p−1LJCK. As for regular expressions, we can compute a
derivative contract ∂p(C) of C with respect to p symbolically, such
that p−1LJCK = LJ∂p(C)K. Figure 7 contains the definition of the
derivative for a single property. We extend this definition to access
paths by
∂E(C) = C
∂p.P(C) = ∂P(∂p(C))
Lemma 2 (Derivatives of Contracts). For all paths P it holds that:
1. LJ∂P(C)K = P−1LJCK
2. LJP .∂P(C)K ⊆ LJCK
3. P ∈ LJCK ⇔ ν(∂P(C))
5.4 Matching
By Lemma 2, C′ = ∂P(C) defines the language containing the
remaining paths after reading P . If path P is not a prefix of a
path in LJCK, then C′ must be the empty set ∅. If P is an element
of LJCK, then the language of C′ contains the empty path E . By
definition, each path and each prefix of a path is readable. Thus,
readability and writeability can be determined by checking whether
the remaining language is the empty set.
Definition 3 (Readable). An access pathP is readable with respect
to contract C iff the derivative of contract C with respect to path P
results in contract C′ with LJC′K 6= ∅. That is:
C ⊢R P ⇔ LJ∂P(C)K 6= ∅ (3)
Every path P in LJCK is writeable. By Lemma 2, we know
that a path P is an element of the language defined by C iff
ǫ ∈ LJ∂P(C)K.
Definition 4 (Writeable). An access path P is writeable with
respect to contract C iff the derivative of C with respect to path
P is nullable. That is:
C ⊢W P ⇔ ν(∂P(C)) (4)
Expression ∋ e ::= c | x | λx.e | e(e) | new e
| e[e] | e[e] = e | permit C in e
Location ∋ ξ
Value ∋ v ::= c | ξ
Monitor ∋ M ::= ∅ | M ⊳R P |M ⊳W P
| M;M′
Access Handler ∋ H ::= 〈P , C〉
Proxy ∋ P ::= 〈ξ,H〉
Prototype ∋ π ::= v
Closure ∋ f ::= ∅ | 〈ρ, λx.e〉
Object ∋ o ::= ∅ | o[str 7→ v]
Storable ∋ s ::= 〈o, f, π〉 | P
Environment ∋ ρ ::= ∅ | ρ[x 7→ v]
Heap ∋ H ::= ∅ | H[ξ 7→ s]
Figure 8. Syntax and semantic domains of λJ .
6. Formalization
This section presents the formal semantics of path monitoring and
contract enforcement in terms of a JavaScript core calculus λJ
extended with access permission contracts and access paths.
6.1 Syntax
λJ (Figure 8) is a call-by-value lambda calculus extended with
objects and object-proxies. The syntax is close to JavaScript core
calculi from the literature [20, 27].
A λJ expression is either a constant c including undefined and
null, a variable x, a lambda expression, an application, an object
creation, a property reference, a property assignment, or a permit
expression. The novel permit expression applies the given contract
C to the object arising from expression e.
6.2 Semantic Domains
Figure 8 defines the semantic domains of λJ .
The heap maps a location ξ to a storable s, which is either a
proxy object P or a triple consisting of an object o, a function
closure f , and a value π as prototype. A Proxy is a wrapper for
a location ξ augmented with an access handler H , which is a tuple
consisting of a path P and a contract C. An object o maps a string
to a value. A function closure consists of an expression e and an
environment ρ, which maps a variable to a value v.
Further, a monitor M is a collection used for effect monitoring.
It records all paths that have been accessed during the evaluation.
The notation M ⊳R P adds path P as read effect to the monitor.
Synonymously, M ⊳W P adds a write effect. M;M′ denotes the
union of two collections.
Figure 9 introduces some abbreviated notations. A property
lookup or a property update on a storable s = 〈o, f, π〉 is relayed to
the underlying object. The property access s(str) returns undefined
by default if the accessed string is not defined in o and the prototype
of s is not a location ξ. The notation H[ξ, str 7→ v] updates a
property of storable H(ξ), H[ξ 7→ π] initializes an object, and
H[ξ 7→ f ] defines a function. Further, we write 〈ξ,P , C〉 for a
protected location.
6.3 Evaluation of λJ
Program execution is modeled by a big-step evaluation judgment
of the formH, ρ ⊢ e ⇓ H′ | v | M. The evaluation of expression
e with initial heap H and environment ρ results in final heap H′,
〈o, f, π〉(str) =


v, o = o′[str → v]
o′(str), o = o′[str′ → v]
H(ξ)(str), o = ∅ ∧ π = ξ
undefined, o = ∅ ∧ π = c
〈o, f, π〉[str 7→ v] = 〈o[str 7→ v], f, π〉
H[ξ, str 7→ v] = H[ξ 7→ H(ξ)[str 7→ v]]
H[ξ 7→ π] = H[ξ 7→ 〈∅, ∅, π〉]
H[ξ 7→ f ] = H[ξ 7→ 〈∅, f, null〉]
〈ξ, 〈P , C〉〉 = 〈ξ,P , C〉
Figure 9. Abbreviations.
(CONST)
H, ρ ⊢ c ⇓ H | c | ∅
(VAR)
H, ρ ⊢ x ⇓ H | ρ(x) | ∅
(ABS)
ξ /∈ dom(H)
H, ρ ⊢ λx.e ⇓ H[ξ 7→ 〈ρ, λx.e〉] | ξ | ∅
(APP)
H, ρ ⊢ e0 ⇓ H
′ | ξ | M
H′, ρ ⊢ e1 ⇓ H
′′ | v1 | M
′
H′′, ξ ⊢App v1 ⇓ H
′′′ | v | M′′
H, ρ ⊢ e0(e1) ⇓ H
′′′ | v | M;M′;M′′
(NEW)
H, ρ ⊢ e ⇓ H′ | v | M ξ /∈ dom(H′)
H, ρ ⊢ new e ⇓ H′[ξ 7→ v] | ξ | M
(GET)
H, ρ ⊢ e0 ⇓ H
′ | ξ | M
H′, ρ ⊢ e1 ⇓ H
′′ | str | M′
H′′, ξ ⊢Get str ⇓ | H
′′′ | v | M′′
H, ρ ⊢ e0[e1] ⇓ H
′′′ | v | M;M′;M′′
(PUT)
H, ρ ⊢ e0 ⇓ H
′ | ξ | M
H′, ρ ⊢ e1 ⇓ H
′′ | str | M′
H′′, ρ ⊢ e2 ⇓ H
′′′ | v | M′′
H′′′, ξ ⊢Put str, v ⇓ H
′′′′ | v′ | M′′′
H, ρ ⊢ e0[e1] = e2 ⇓ H
′′′′ | v′ | M;M′;M′′;M′′′
(PERMIT)
H, ρ ⊢ e ⇓ H′ | ξ | M
ξ′ /∈ dom(H′) H′′ = H′[ξ′ 7→ 〈ξ, ǫ, C〉]
H, ρ ⊢ permit C in e ⇓ H′′ | ξ′ | M
Figure 10. Inference rules for λJ .
value v, and monitor M. The Figures 10, 11, 12, and 13 contain its
inference rules.
The rules (CONST), (VAR), (ABS) are standard. (NEW) allo-
cates a new object based on the evaluated prototype. The rule (PER-
MIT) creates a new proxy object for the location resulting from the
subexpression. The handler of this proxy contains an empty access
path ǫ and the initial contract C.
Function application, property lookup and property assignment
distinguish two cases: either the operation applies directly to a tar-
(APP-NOPROXY)
〈o, 〈ρ˙, λx.e〉, π〉 = H(ξ)
H, ρ˙[x 7→ v] ⊢ e ⇓ H′ | v′ | M
H, ξ ⊢App v ⇓ H
′ | v′ | M
(APP-PROXY)
〈ξ′,P , C〉 = H(ξ)
H,H(ξ′) ⊢App c ⇓ H
′ | v′ | M
H, ξ ⊢App c ⇓ H
′ | v′ | M
(APP-MEMBRANE)
〈ξ′′,P , C〉 = H(ξ) ξ′′′ /∈ dom(H′)
H[ξ′′′ 7→ 〈ξ′, ǫ, C〉],H(ξ′′) ⊢App ξ
′′′ ⇓ H′ | v′ | M
H, ξ ⊢App ξ
′ ⇓ H′ | v′ | M
Figure 11. Inference rules for function application.
(GET-NOPROXY)
〈o, f, π〉 = H(ξ)
H, ξ ⊢Get str ⇓ H | o(str) | ∅
(GET-PROXY)
〈ξ′,P , C〉 = H(ξ) C ⊢R str
H, ξ′ ⊢Get str ⇓ H
′ | c | M
H, ξ ⊢Get str ⇓ H
′ | c | M ⊳R P .str
(GET-MEMBRANE)
〈ξ′,P , C〉 = H(ξ) C ⊢R str
H, ξ′ ⊢Get str ⇓ H
′ | ξ′′ | M
P = 〈ξ′′,P .str, ∂str(C)〉 ξ
′′′ /∈ dom(H′)
H, ξ ⊢Get str ⇓ H
′[ξ′′′ 7→ P ] | ξ′′′ | M ⊳R P .str
Figure 12. Inference rules for property reference.
(PUT-NOPROXY)
〈o, f, π〉 = H(ξ)
H, ξ ⊢Put str, v ⇓ H[ξ, str 7→ v] | v | ∅
(PUT-PROXY)
〈ξ′,P , C〉 = H(ξ) C ⊢W str
H, ξ′ ⊢Put str, v ⇓ H
′ | v′ | M
H, ξ ⊢Put str, v ⇓ H
′ | v′ | M ⊳W P .str
Figure 13. Inference rules for property assignment.
get object or it applies to a proxy. If the given reference is a non-
proxy object, then the usual rules apply: (APP-NOPROXY) for call-
ing the closure and rules (GET-NOPROXY) and (PUT-NOPROXY)
for property read and write. Otherwise, if the given reference is a
proxy, then the proxy rules formalize the operation implemented by
the trap.
In case of a function proxy, the contract is applied to the ar-
gument to protect the function’s input. If the argument is a con-
stant (APP-PROXY), then the constant need not be wrapped and the
function application is forwarded to the target object. Otherwise, if
the argument is a location (APP-MEMBRANE), then the argument
is wrapped in a new proxy with the function’s contract and then
passed to the target function. This wrapping may happen multiple
times.
To perform a property read on a proxy, the handler first checks
whether the access is allowed by the contract. If so and in case the
accessed value is a constant, then the value gets returned in rule
(GET-PROXY). Otherwise, if the value is a location, the location
gets wrapped by the derivative of the original contract with respect
to the accessed property ∂str(C) and an extended path P .str (GET-
MEMBRANE). The accessed object is now wrapped with the deriva-
tive that describes the remaining permitted paths. Thus, a property
access to a wrapped object only returns constants or wrapped ob-
jects so that the membrane remains intact. In both cases the monitor
registers the accessed path.
In a similar way, the property assignment checks if the property
is writeable with respect to the given contract (PUT-PROXY). If so,
the value gets assigned and the monitor extended by a write effect.
Both, the get and put rules, signal a violation by being stuck.
The behavior of the implementation is configurable: it may raise
an exception and stop execution or it may just log the violation
and continue. This behavior could be formalized as well by intro-
ducing separate crash judgments. We omit the definition of these
judgments because their inference rules largely duplicate the rules
from Figures 10, 11, 12, and 13.
7. Reduction
As the target object of a proxy may be a proxy itself, there may
be a chain of proxies to traverse before reaching the actual non-
proxy target object. Such chains waste memory, they increase the
run time of all operations, and the intermediate proxies may contain
redundant information. To avoid the creation of inefficient chains
of nested proxies, we create a “proxy of a proxy” as follows: the
new proxy directly refers to the target of the existing proxy, its path
set is the union of the new path and the already existing pathset,
and its contract is merged with the contract of the already existing
handler. Fortunately, contracts can be merged easily by using the
conjunction operator &, which means that the restrictions enforced
along all reaching paths are enforced. Extending the formalization,
the handler contains a set of paths, instead of a single path.
However, naively following this approach leads to two prob-
lems. First, a path update operation has to extend every path in a
set and the redundant parts in a set waste a lot of memory. Sec-
ond, the combination of contracts may result in a contract whose
parts cancel or subsume one another. Redundant parts in a com-
bined contract also waste memory and make the computation of the
derivative more expensive. As a result, in our initial experiments,
test cases with many objects could not be analyzed in a sensible
amount of time.
This section reports some optimizations to reduce memory con-
sumption and to improve the run time.
7.1 Trie Structure
In a first step, we changed the representation of a set of access paths
to a trie structure [17]. Let PathTrie ∋ T ::= ∅ | T [p 7→ T ′] be a
trie structure used as prefix tree to store paths P . At each node T ,
there is at most one association [p 7→ T ′] for each property p. It
indicates that there is a path of the form p.P in the trie, where P is
in T ′. We use [ǫ 7→ ∅] to mark the end of a path.
A path P in a trie T is thus represented by the concatenation of
the properties p on a path from the root to an edge labeled with the
empty path ǫ.
Using trie structures enables us to share prefixes in path sets,
which reduces the memory usage significantly. In particular, linked
data structures like lists and trees give rise to many shared prefixes
which are represented efficiently by the trie structure.
7.2 Contract Rewriting
Besides the normalization of contracts (Section 5.2) the contain-
ment reduction of contracts is important to reduce memory con-
sumption. Containment reduction means that a contract C+C′ can
be reduced to C if LJC′K ⊆ LJCK. Similarly, C&C′ can be reduced
to C′ if LJC′K ⊆ LJCK. The implementation also accounts for com-
mutativity.
First, we define a semantic containment relation on contracts.
Definition 5 (Containment). A contract C is contained in another
contract C′, written as C ⊑ C′, iff LJCK ⊆ LJC′K.
The containment relation on contracts is reflexive and transitive
and thus forms a preorder. As it is defined semantically, we need
a syntactic decision procedure for containment of contracts to put
it to use. This procedure is inspired by Antimirov’s calculus [2],
which provides a non-deterministic decision procedure to solve the
containment problem for ordinary regular expressions.
From the definition of containment (Definition 5), we obtain
that C ⊑ C′ iff for all paths P ∈ LJCK the derivative of contract C′
with respect to path P is nullable ν(∂P(C′)).
Lemma 3 (Containment).
C ⊑ C′ ⇔ ν(∂P(C
′)) for all P ∈ LJCK (5)
The proof is by Lemma 1 and 2.
As this lemma does not yield an effective way of deciding con-
tainment, we aim to enumerate the access paths of C by iteratively
extracting its possible first properties and forming the derivatives
on both sides as in Antimirov’s procedure.
Definition 6 (next). The function next : C → A returns the first
properties p of path elements P in LJCK.
next(C) = {p | p.P ∈ LJCK} (6)
From Antimirov’s theorem [2], we obtain that C ⊑ C′ iff ν(C)
implies ν(C′) and ∀p : ∂p(C) ⊑ ∂p(C′).
Lemma 4 (Containment2).
C ⊑ C′ ⇔ (∀p ∈ next(C)) ∂p(C) ⊑ ∂p(C
′)
∧ (ν(C)⇒ ν(C′))
(7)
The proof combines the assertion of Lemma 3 with the stepwise
derivative of Lemma 2.
Unfortunately, it is in general impossible to construct all deriva-
tives with respect to all first properties. In case of a question mark
literal or a negation, there may be infinitely many first literals. Thus,
the implementation needs to apply some kind of approximation.
7.2.1 Literal-derivative of Contracts
To abstract from the derivative of a contract with respect to a
property, we introduce a literal-based derivative which forms the
derivative of a contract with respect to a literal ℓ. This operation
admits derivatives with respect to the contract literals @, ?, r, and
!r, and performs some approximation by returning a contract that
is contained in the derivatives resulting from expanding the literals.
As the literals include character-level regular expressions that
we treat as abstract, we rely on a relation ⊑r that decides contain-
ment of literals and on an operation ⊓r that builds the intersection
of two literals. Both are considered as abstract operators on the
language of regular expression literals and we do not specify their
implementation (but similar methods as for contracts apply).
ℓ ⊑r r ⇔ LJℓK ⊆ LJrK (8)
LJℓ ⊓r rK = LJℓK ∩ LJrK (9)
Figure 14 contains the definition of the syntactic derivative with
respect to a literal. Deriving a literal ℓ w.r.t. itself results in the
∇ℓ(@) =
{
E , ℓ = @
∅, otherwise
∇ℓ(?) = E
∇ℓ(r) =
{
E , ℓ ⊑r r
∅, otherwise
∇ℓ(!r) =
{
E , ℓ ⊓r r = ∅
∅, otherwise
∇ℓ(∅) = ∅
∇ℓ(E) = ∅
∇ℓ(C∗) = ∇ℓ(C).C∗
∇ℓ(C+C
′) = ∇ℓ(C)+∇ℓ(C
′)
∇ℓ(C&C
′) = ∇ℓ(C)&∇ℓ(C
′)
∇ℓ(C.C
′) =
{
∇ℓ(C).C
′+∇ℓ(C
′), ν(C)
∇ℓ(C).C
′, otherwise
Figure 14. Derivative of a contract by a contract literal.
first(@) = {@}
first(?) = {?}
first(r) = {r}
first(!r) = {!r}
first(∅) = {}
first(E) = {}
first(C∗) = first(C)
first(C+C′) = first(C) ∪ first(C′)
first(C&C′) = {ℓ ⊓r ℓ
′ | ℓ ∈ first(C), ℓ′ ∈ first(C′)}
first(C.C′) =
{
first(C) ∪ first(C′), ν(C)
first(C), otherwise
Figure 15. first on contracts.
empty contract E . Applying any derivative to the empty set ∅ yields
the empty set ∅. The derivative of a regular expression literal r w.r.t.
a literal ℓ is the empty contract E if the language of ℓ is subsumed
by the regular expression r, that is, if we can make a step with
each character in the literal. Similarly, the derivative of a negated
regular expression literal !r w.r.t. a literal ℓ is the empty contract E
if no property of the language of ℓ can make a step in r. Otherwise,
the result is ∅. The remaining cases are exactly as in the derivative
with respect to a property.
The following lemma states the connection between the deriva-
tive by contract literal and the derivative by a property.
Lemma 5 (Syntactic derivative of contracts). ∀ℓ :
LJ∇ℓ(C)K ⊆
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C)K (10)
7.2.2 Containment
Using the syntactic derivation, we are able to abstract the derivative
of a contract w.r.t. an infinite property set by forming derivatives
with respect to literals. Before combining this abstraction with the
containment lemma (Lemma 4), we define a function to obtain the
first literals of a contract as shown in Figure 15.
The first literal of a literal ℓ is ℓ. ∅ and E have no first literals.
The first literals of a Kleene star contract C∗ are the first literals
of its subcontract. The first literals of a disjunction are the union
of the first literals of its subcontracts. For a conjunction, the set of
first literals is the set of all intersections ℓ ⊓r ℓ′ of the first literals
(C-DISPROVE)
ν(C) ¬ν(C′)
Γ ⊢ C ⊑ C′ : ⊥
(C-DELETE)
φ ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢ φ : ⊤
(C-UNFOLD-TRUE)
φ /∈ Γ ∀ℓ ∈ first(φ) : 〈Γ, φ〉 ⊢ ∇ℓ(φ) : ⊤
Γ ⊢ φ : ⊤
(C-UNFOLD-FALSE)
φ /∈ Γ ∃ℓ ∈ first(φ) : 〈Γ, φ〉 ⊢ ∇ℓ(φ) : ⊥
Γ ⊢ φ : ⊥
Figure 16. Unfolding axioms and rules.
of both conjuncts. The first literals of a concatenation are the first
literals of its first subcontract if the first subcontract is not nullable.
Otherwise, it is the union of the first literals of both subcontracts.
The language of the first literals is defined to be the union of the
languages of its literals.
LJfirst(C)K =
⋃
ℓ∈first(C)
LJℓK (11)
Lemma 6 (first).
next(C) = LJfirst(C)K (12)
Lemma 7 (Syntactic derivative of contracts 2). ∀ℓ ∈ first(C) :
LJ∇ℓ(C)K =
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C)K (13)
Theorem 1 (Containment).
C ⊑ C′ ⇐ (∀ℓ ∈ first(C ⊑ C′))∇ℓ(C) ⊑ ∇ℓ(C
′)
∧ (ν(C)⇒ ν(C′))
(14)
7.2.3 Containment Semantics
Based on the containment theorem (Theorem 1) and the syntactic
derivative, we present an algorithm that approximates the contain-
ment relation of contracts.
To recapitulate, a path P is an element of the language defined
by a contract C iff the derivative of contract C w.r.t. path P is
nullable ν(∂P(C)). If a contract C is not contained in a contract
C′, then there exists at least one access path P ∈ LJCK that derives
a non-nullable contract from C′.
Define containment expressions by φ ::= C ⊑ C′ and let
a context Γ be a set of previous visited containment expressions.
The context lookup φ ∈ Γ determines if an expression is already
calculated in this chain. The derivation of a containment expression
∇ℓ(C ⊑ C
′) is forwarded to its subcontracts as ∇ℓ(C) ⊑ ∇ℓ(C′).
The decision procedure is defined by a judgment of the form
Γ ⊢ φ : {⊤,⊥}. The evaluation of expression φ in context Γ re-
sults either in true ⊤ or false ⊥. In Figure 16, rule (C-DISPROVE)
shows the generalized disproving axiom. If the first contract C is
nullable and the second contract C′ is not nullable, then there exists
at least one element–the empty access path E–in the language of
LJCK which is not element of LJC′K. This condition is sufficient to
disprove the inequality, so the rule returns false. Rule (C-DELETE)
returns true if the evaluated expression is already subsumed by the
context. Further derivatives of φ would not contribute new informa-
tion. (C-UNFOLD-TRUE) and (C-UNFOLD-FALSE) applies only if
φ is not in the context. It applies all derivatives according to first(φ)
and conjoins them together.
(C-IDENTITY)
Γ ⊢ C ⊑ C : ⊤
(C-PROOF-EDGE)
emp(C) ∨ unv(C′)
Γ ⊢ C ⊑ C′ : ⊤
(C-NULLABLE)
ν(C′)
Γ ⊢ E ⊑ C′ : ⊤
Figure 17. Prove axioms.
(C-DISPROVE-EMPTY)
¬emp(C) emp(C′)
Γ ⊢ C ⊑ C′ : ⊥
(C-DISPROVE-BLANK)
ind(C) ∨ unv(C) bl(C′)
Γ ⊢ C ⊑ C′ : ⊥
Figure 18. Disprove axioms.
⌊C∗⌋ =
{
E , emp(C) ∨ bl(C)
⌊C⌋∗, otherwise
⌊C+C′⌋ =


∅, emp(C) ∧ emp(C′)
@, bl(C) ∧ bl(C′)
⌊C⌋, C ⊒ C′
⌊C′⌋, C ⊑ C′
⌊C⌋+⌊C′⌋, otherwise
⌊C&C′⌋ =


∅, emp(C) ∨ emp(C′)
@, bl(C) ∨ bl(C′)
⌊C⌋, C ⊑ C′
⌊C′⌋, C ⊒ C′
⌊C⌋&⌊C′⌋, otherwise
⌊C.C′⌋ =


∅, emp(C)
@, bl(C)
⌊C⌋.⌊C′⌋, otherwise
Figure 19. Reduction rules.
Theorem 2 (Correctness).
Γ ⊢ C ⊑ C′ : ⊤ ⇒ C ⊑ C′ (15)
In addition to the rules from Figure 16, we add auxiliary axioms
to detect trivially consistent (inconsistent) inequalities early (Fig-
ures 17 for consistent inequalities and 18 for inconsistent ones).
They decide containment directly without unfolding. The axioms
rely on four functions that operate on the contract syntax: bl, emp,
ind, and unv. Each of them is correct, but not complete. For in-
stance, the function emp can only approximate whether the lan-
guage of a contract of the form C&C′ denotes the empty set. The
following definition specifies these functions, their actual defini-
tions are straightforward and thus elided.
Definition 7. A contract C is . . .
blank if LJCK = {ι}, let bl(C) = ⊤ imply C is blank;
empty if LJCK = ∅, let emp(C) = ⊤ ⇒ imply C is empty;
indifferent if LJCK = A, let ind(C) = ⊤ imply C is indifferent;
universal if LJCK = A∗, let unv(C) = ⊤ imply C is universal.
7.2.4 Reductions Rules
Finally, we apply the preceding machinery to define a reduction
function ⌊·⌋ on contracts in Figure 19. Reduction produces an
equivalent contract, which is smaller than its input.
Literals and empty contracts are not further reducible. A Kleene
star contract C∗ is reduced to the empty contract E if the subcon-
tract is either empty or blank. The disjunction contract C+C′ is
reduced to the empty set ∅ if both contracts are empty or it reduces
to the empty literal @ if both contracts are blank. If one of the sub-
contracts is subsumed by the other one, the subsuming contract is
used. Similarly, the conjunction contract C&C′ is reduced to the
empty set ∅ or the empty literal @ if one of the subcontracts is
empty or blank. If one contract subsumes the other, then the sub-
sumed contract is used. The concatenation C.C′ is reduced to the
empty set ∅ if the first subcontract is empty or it is reduced to the
empty literal @ if the first sub-contract is blank.
8. Implementation
The implementation is based on the JavaScript Proxy API [14, 43],
a proposed addition to the JavaScript standard. This API is imple-
mented in Firefox since version 18.0 and in Chrome V8 since ver-
sion 3.5. We developed the implementation using the SpiderMon-
key JavaScript-C 1.8.5 (2011-03-31) JavaScript engine.
8.1 Description
The implementation provides a proxy handler AccessHandler
that overrides all trap functions. The traps implement the access
control mechanism as well as path monitoring. They either interrupt
the operation, if it is not permitted, or forward it to the target object.
They maintain the path set and contract data structures using the
fly-weight pattern to minimize memory consumption.
Our framework can easily be included in existing JavaScript
software projects. Its functionality is encapsulated in a facade
whose interface–the function permit–can be used to wrap objects.
The framework provides two evaluation modes, Observer Mode
and Protector Mode. The Observer Mode performs only path and
violation logging without changing the semantics of the underlying
program. Thus, if a program reads multiple properties along a
prohibited path, then each individual read is logged as a violation.
For example, suppose an object is protected by the contract ’b+c’.
Reading property a results in a violation with access path a and a
subsequent read of a .b results in a violation of a .b, and so on.
The Protector Mode follows the scripting-language philosophy
as implemented in the rest of JavaScript. If a read access violates
the contract of an object, the value undefined is returned instead
of an abnormal termination. Forbidden write accesses are simply
omitted. Thus, only top-level violations are visible.
Our framework comes with a JavaScript-based GUI. Included
in a web page, the interface shows all accessed paths as well as all
incurred contract violations. A heuristic allows us to generate short
effect descriptions from the gathered path sets using the approach
reported elsewhere [22, 24].
8.2 Limitations
Because of the browser’s sandbox, JSConTest2 cannot directly
protect DOM objects with access permission contracts. The se-
curity mechanism forbids to replace the references to the window
and document objects by suitably contracted proxies. This deficiency
can be partially addressed by embedding an entire script in a scope
which substitutes the global object by a suitable proxy.
The use of proxies for access control has one unfortunate con-
sequence: the equality operators == and === do not work correctly,
anymore. Dependening on the access path, the same target object
may have different access rights and hence distinct proxies that en-
force these rights. Comparing these distinct proxies returns false
even though the underlying target is the same. Similarly, an un-
wrapped target object may be compared with its contracted version,
which should be true, but yields false.
Here is an example illustrating the problem.
1 var ch = { c : 42 }
2 var r o o t = APC . permit ( ’ a .@+b . c ’ , { a : ch , b : ch })
3 var s ame acc = ( r o o t . a === r o o t . b )
4 var same unw = ( ch === r o o t . b )
With our implementation, both same acc and same unw are false al-
though they are true without the permit operation.
Unfortunately, there is no easy way to address this shortcoming.
One possibility is to assign each target a unique proxy, which
requires a potentially unintuitive merge of different access contract.
Another idea would be to trap the equality operation, which is not
supported by the proxy API. However, neither the unique proxy
nor trapping the equality operation would solve the problem with
comparing the proxy with its target as in same unw (just consider ===
as a method call on the unwrapped target object ch in line 4).
The best solution would be to provide two proxy-aware equality
functions and replace all uses of == and === by these functions.
This solution would require some light rewriting of the source code
(also at run time to support eval), which is much less intrusive than
the rewriting of the original JSConTest implementation. Currently,
we do not supply this rewriting because none of the programs we
examined in our evaluation were affected by the problem.
9. Evaluation
This section reports on our experiences with applying JSConTest2
to selected programs. All benchmarks were run on a MacBook
Pro with a 2 GHz Intel Core i7 processor with 8 GB memory. All
example runs and timings reported in this paper were obtained with
version 23.0a2 (2013-05-21) of the Firefox Aurora browser.
9.1 Benchmark Programs
To evaluate our implementation, we applied it to a range of
JavaScript programs: the Google V8 Benchmark Suite2 and a se-
lection of benchmarks accompanying the TAJS system [28].
The Google V8 Benchmark Suite consists of a webpage with
several JavaScript programs, which are listed in Figure 20. The
benchmarks range from about 400 to 5000 lines of code imple-
menting an OS kernel simulation, constraint solving, encryption,
ray tracing, parsing, regular expression operations, benchmarking
data structures, and solving differential equations. The suite was
originally composed to evaluate the performance of JavaScript en-
gines. It is designed to stress various aspects of the implementation
of a JavaScript engine, but the programs it contains are not neces-
sarily representative of the typical programs run in a browser.
The TAJS benchmarks consist of JavaScript programs and
dumped Web pages collected in the wild to test the static anal-
ysis system TAJS. To easily run the tests in the Aurora web
browser, we selected all programs that came packaged with a
webpage: 3dmodel, countdown, oryx, ajaxtabscontent, arkanoid,
ball pool, bunnyhunt, gamespot, google pacman, jscalc, jscrypto,
logo, mceditor, minesweeper, msie9, simple calc, wala. The selec-
tion further contains programs like a calculator or a simple browser
game as well as libraries extending the functionality of JavaScript
like jQuery, a linked list data type, or an MD5 hashing library. We
also applied our system to a number of dumped web pages like
youtube, twitter, or imageshack.
9.2 Methodology
To evaluate our implementation with the Google Benchmarks, we
manually examined their source code, identified frequently used
objects, and marked them with an empty contract @. Each access
to those objects generated an access violation, which was logged.
In the TAJS benchmarks, we looked for interesting objects and
functions, non-locally used data, and uses of external libraries like
2 http://v8.googlecode.com/svn/data/benchmarks/v7/run.html
Benchmark Full Without Contracts Baseline
logging only
Richards 22.5min 18.6min 3.3sec 2.3sec
DeltaBlue 9.8sec 9.5sec 3.3sec 2.3sec
Crypto 4.2h 2.5h 2.6min 4.4sec
RayTrace 1.2h 1.1h 1.6min 2.3sec
EarleyBoyer 4.4sec 4.4sec 4.4sec 4.3sec
RegExp 2.4sec 2.4sec 2.4sec 2.4sec
Splay - - 2.3sec 2.3sec
NavierStokes 2.3sec 2.3sec 2.3sec 2.3sec
Figure 20. Google V8 Benchmark Suite.
jQuery. In a first run, we augmented these objects with a univer-
sal contract (e.g. ?∗) to monitor the accessed properties. Based on
the generated protocol we prepared customized contracts to protect
these objects. To exercise the customized contracts, we extended
the source code with additional, nonconforming operations to pro-
voke violations.
9.3 Results
With our initial implementation, contract enforcement for programs
in the Google V8 Benchmark Suite was not possible, because the
browser quickly ran out of memory. Our reimplementation based
on the ideas described in Section 7 enabled us to cut down memory
consumption dramatically.3 The reduction in memory use of path
logging comes at the expense of higher computational cost. The
reimplemented system successfully applies contract enforcement
to all programs in the Google V8 Benchmark Suite; for the Splay
benchmark, we have no numbers for path set collection and logging
because it did not terminate within four hours.
Figure 20 contains the run times for all V8 benchmark programs
in different configurations. The column Full contains the run time
for contract enforcement, path set collection, and log output. The
effect heuristic to condense the resulting set of paths to a short
effect description is disabled. The column Without logging shows
the time used for contract enforcement and path set collection, but
without logging. The column Contracts only shows the time for
contract enforcement, without any path set generation. The last
column Baseline shows the baseline for a run without JSConTest2.
Using forwarding proxies instead of normal objects did not have
a measurable effect: in addition to the above configurations, we ran
the benchmarks with forwarding proxies, where the handler inter-
cepts all operations but the trap functions forward the operation to
the target object, as shown in Figure 1. The resulting run times ex-
hibit no measurable difference to the numbers in column Baseline.
In most benchmarks, the run-time difference between contract
enforcement and the baseline is negligible, so monitoring is cheap.
The exceptions are Crypto and RayTrace where the contract is
applied to the main API object.
The run times for the programs in the V8 Benchmark Suite
range from few seconds up to four hours when running with con-
tract monitoring fully engaged. This run time depends on the ob-
jects chosen for contract monitoring: contracting heavily used ob-
jects causes more overhead (viz. Crypto and RayTrace), contract-
ing the root of a tree (for example in Splay) also causes overhead
because the membrane implementation creates a shadow tree pop-
ulated with proxies while the program runs.
Unfortunately, the most expensive benchmark (Splay) increases
the size of the trie structure in a way that the contract implemen-
tation was not able to handle efficiently. Further optimizations like
condensing paths are required to run this benchmark to completion.
3 Unfortunately, we did not find a way to measure memory consumption.
The second most expensive benchmark (Crypto) produces more
than 5GB output of logged paths, depending on the selected object.
For comparison, the benchmark Richards requires approximately
22.5 minutes to calculate slightly more than 1GB of logged paths.
In Crypto, a significant percentage of the memory consumption and
the computation time is due to the path recovery at the end of the
run. This mechanism flattens a trie structure to a list of paths, which
removes all sharing from the structure. It accounts for much of the
difference between columns Full and Without logging in Figure 20.
These examples show that the run time impact of monitoring is
highly dependent on the program and on the particular values that
are monitored. While some programs are heavily affected (Crypto,
Richards, RayTrace, Splay), others are almost unaffected: Earley-
Boyer, RegEx, NavierStokes.
The numbers also show that the path logging accounts for most
of the run-time overhead: the biggest fraction of the total run time
is used for path generation, which comprises appending of trie
structures and merging tries. The remaining time is spent for path
reconstruction, logging, and log output.
The evaluation of contracts themselves is negligible in many
cases, but occasionally it may create an overhead of 35x (Crypto) to
41x (RayTrace). On the other hand, these programs are an artificial
selection to stress the JavaScript implementation.
The run times of the more realistic collection of TAJS bench-
mark programs are all much shorter (less than one second) than the
run times for the V8 benchmarks. Furthermore, the difference be-
tween the run times of the four configurations listed in Figure 20
is negligible for the TAJS benchmarks. These findings indicate that
contract monitoring seems feasible for realistic programs.
9.4 General Observations
The benchmarks show that the most time-consuming parts are path
logging and contract derivation. Their overhead is influenced by
several factors: the number and frequency of proxy calls and the
length of access chains.
The length of the access chains determines the number of
derivation steps and the size of the trie structure. Further, the num-
ber of nested proxies influences the number of merge operations
and can cause a blowup of the data structures. Path extension and
computing the contract derivative is more expensive on merged
handlers. Also, the structure of the contract affects the performance.
Wide and complex contracts require more derivation steps than
deep contracts. In addition, a derived contract sometimes gets big-
ger than the original contract. For example, the contract a∗+a∗.a∗
is the result of deriving a∗.a∗ by a. All these factors contribute to
the time and space complexity of contract monitoring.
10. Related Work
JSConTest [22, 24] is a framework for logging side effects and
enforcing path-based access permission contracts. It comes with an
algorithm [23] that infers a concise effect description from a set of
access paths. Access permission contract enable the specification
of effects to restrict the access to the object graph by defining a
set of permitted access paths. JSConTest is based on an offline
code transformation. Its implementation is restricted to a subset of
the language, it does not scale to large programs, and it is hard to
guarantee full interposition.
Access permission contracts are closely related to extended reg-
ular expression. Permissions are computed from the iterated deriva-
tive of a contracts by the current access path. Derivatives of ex-
tended regular expressions and their properties are well known
from the literature [3, 10, 39]. Computing contract subsumption
is related to solving regular expression inequalities and checking
regular expression equivalence, which has been addressed in sev-
eral places [2, 25, 31]. Most approaches rely on NFA checking
[7, 32] or on rewriting [1, 4, 42]. For checking contract subsump-
tion, we adapted Antimirov’s approach to obtain a reasonably fast
algorithm. We extended Antimirov’s algorithm to an infinite alpha-
bet and to extended regular expressions including negation and in-
tersection.
The JavaScript Reflection API [14, 43] enables developers to
easily enhance the functionality of objects and functions. The im-
plementation of proxies opens up the means to fully interpose oper-
ations applied to objects and functions calls. Proxies have already
been used for dynamic effects systems [26]. Other common uses
for proxies, e.g. [5, 8, 9, 15, 37, 44], are meta-level extension, be-
havioral reflection, security, or concurrency control.
There are further proposals to limit effects on heap-allocated
objects both statically and dynamically. An effect system is a static
analysis that partitions the heap into disjoint regions and annotates
the type of a heap reference with the region in which the reference
points [18]. Although initially developed for functional languages,
region-based effects have been transposed to object-oriented lan-
guages [19]. A notable proposal targeting Java is the type and effect
system of DPJ [6]. DPJ targets parallel execution and provides by
default a deterministic semantics.
Also, specification languages like JML [11, 33] include a mech-
anism for specifying side effects, the assignable clause. While
the JML toolchain supports verification as well as run-time mon-
itoring [12, 34, 35], assignable clauses are not widely used,
partly because their semantics has not been formally and unan-
imously defined until recently [35], and partly because support
for assignable clauses is present in only a few tools that per-
form run-time monitoring for JML [36] and then not always in full
generality[12].
Our system may also be useful to guarantee security aspects
like confidentiality or integrity of information. In JavaScript, static
approaches are often lacking because of the dynamicity of the
language. However, the approaches range from static and dynamic
control of information flow control [13, 21, 29] over restricting the
functionality [38] to the isolations of scopes [40].
11. Conclusion
We successfully applied JavaScript proxies to the implementation
of effect logging and dynamic enforcement of access permission
contracts, which specify the allowed side effects using access paths
in the object graph. The implementation avoids the shortcomings
of an earlier implementation in the JSConTest system, which is
based on an offline code transformation. The proxy-based approach
handles the full JavaScript language, including the with-statement,
eval, and arbitrary dynamic code loading techniques. Contrary to
the earlier implementation, the proxy-based approach guarantees
full interposition.
This reimplementation presents a major step towards practical
applicability of access permission contracts. The run-time over-
head and the additional memory consumption of pure contract en-
forcement is negligible. Hence, we believe that this implementation
can provide encapsulation in realistic applications, as demonstrated
with our examples and case studies. Full effect logging, on the other
hand, incurs quite some overhead, but we regard it primarily as a
tool for program understanding and debugging.
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(GET-PROXY-OBSERVER)
〈ξ′,P ,C〉 = H(ξ) C 6⊢R str
H, ξ′ ⊢Get str ⇓ H
′ | c | M
H, ξ ⊢Get str ⇓ H
′ | c | M ◭R (P .str, C)
(GET-MEMBRANE-OBSERVER)
〈ξ′,P ,C〉 = H(ξ) C 6⊢R str
H, ξ′ ⊢Get str ⇓ H
′ | ξ′′ | M
P = 〈ξ′′,P .str, ∂str(C)〉 ξ
′′′ /∈ dom(H′)
H, ξ ⊢Get str ⇓ H
′[ξ′′′ 7→ P ] | ξ′′′ | M ◭R (P .str, C)
PUT-PROXY-OBSERVER)
〈ξ′,P , C〉 = H(ξ) C 6⊢W str
H, ξ′ ⊢Put str, v ⇓ H
′ | v′ | M
H, ξ ⊢Put str, v ⇓ H
′ | v′ | M ◭W (P .str, C)
Figure 21. Inference rules for Observer Mode.
(GET-PROXY-PROTECTOR)
〈ξ′,P ,C〉 = H(ξ) C 6⊢R str
H, ξ ⊢Get str ⇓ H
′ | undefined | M ◭R (P .str, C)
PUT-PROXY-PROTECTOR)
〈ξ′,P , C〉 = H(ξ) C 6⊢W str
H, ξ ⊢Put str, v ⇓ H
′ | v | M ◭W (P .str, C)
Figure 22. Inference rules for Protector Mode.
[44] E. Wernli, P. Maerki, and O. Nierstrasz. Ownership, filters and cross-
ing handlers: flexible ownership in dynamic languages. In A. Warth,
editor, DLS, pages 83–94. ACM, 2012.
A. Crashing rules
This section presents the formal semantics of path monitoring and
contract enforcement in case of a violated contract. The rules ex-
tend the set of inference rules of section 6.
The implementation covers two different types of violation
treatment. Figure 21 and 22 contain its evaluation rules. The Ob-
server Mode performs only path and violation logging without any
interruption. M ◭R (P ,C) and M ◭W (P , C) extends the mon-
itor to log a violation. The Protector Mode returns undefined for
an access instead of an abnormal termination or omits the opera-
tion.
B. Extended Membrane
Section 7 introduces the necessity of merged proxies to avoid
inefficient chains of nested proxy calls.
Figure 23 extends the inference rules from section 6 with path-
tries and merged handlers. The single path P in a handler H gets
changed into a trie T . We write P ∈ T if path P is represented by
T . The operator⊕ appends property p to all path-endings in trie T .
A trie T ′ = (T ⊕ (p.P ′)) is equivalent to T ′ = ((T ⊕ p)⊕ P ′),
appending p.P ′ to T . (T ⊎T ′) = (T ⊕P) | ∀P ∈ T ′ denotes the
union of the tries T and T ′.
Further, the definition of monitor M is extended by M ⊳R T ,
extending monitor M with all paths P ∈ T . The definitions of
M ⊳W T ,M ◭R (T , C), and M ◭W (T , C) and the extensions
to the crashing rules (Figure 21 ans 22) are analogous.
(GET-TRIEPROXY)
〈ξ′, T , C〉 = H(ξ) C ⊢R str
H, ξ′ ⊢Get str ⇓ H
′ | c | M
H, ξ ⊢Get str ⇓ H
′ | c | M ⊳R (T ⊕ str)
(GET-TRIEMEMBRANE-NONEXISTING)
〈ξ′, T , C〉 = H(ξ) C ⊢R str
H, ξ′ ⊢Get str ⇓ H
′ | ξ′′ | M ξ′′ = 〈o, f, π〉
P = 〈ξ′′, (T ⊕ str), ∂str(C)〉 ξ
′′′ /∈ dom(H′)
H, ξ ⊢Get str ⇓ H
′[ξ′′′ 7→ P ] | ξ′′′ | M ⊳R (T ⊕ str)
(GET-TRIEMEMBRANE-EXISTING)
〈ξ′, T , C〉 = H(ξ) C ⊢R str
H, ξ′ ⊢Get str ⇓ H
′ | ξ′′ | M ξ′′ = 〈ξ′′′, T ′, C′〉
P = 〈ξ′′′, ((T ⊕ str) ⊎ T ′), ∂str(C)&C
′〉 ξ′′′′ /∈ dom(H′)
H, ξ ⊢Get str ⇓ H
′[ξ′′′′ 7→ P ] | ξ′′′′ | M ⊳R (T ⊕ str)
PUT-TRIEPROXY)
〈ξ′, T , C〉 = H(ξ) C ⊢W str
H, ξ′ ⊢Put str, v ⇓ H
′ | v′ | M
H, ξ ⊢Put str, v ⇓ H
′ | v′ | M ⊳W (T ⊕ str)
Figure 23. Inference rules for extended membranes.
bl(@) = ⊤
bl(?) = ⊥
bl(r) = ⊥
bl(!r) = ⊥
bl(∅) = ⊥
bl(E) = ⊥
bl(C∗) = ⊥
bl(C+C′) = bl(C) ∧ bl(C′)
bl(C&C′) = bl(C) ∨ bl(C′)
bl(C.C′) = bl(C)
Figure 24. The bl function.
emp(@) = ⊥
emp(?) = ⊥
emp(r) = ⊥
emp(!r) = ⊥
emp(∅) = ⊤
emp(E) = ⊥
emp(C∗) = ⊥
emp(C+C′) = emp(C) ∨ emp(C′)
emp(C&C′) = first(C&C′) = ∅
emp(C.C′) = emp(C) ∨ emp(C′)
Figure 25. The emp function.
ind(@) = ⊥
ind(?) = ⊤
ind(r) = ⊥
ind(!r) = ⊥
ind(∅) = ⊥
ind(E) = ⊥
ind(C∗) = ind(C)
ind(C+C′) = ind(C) ∨ ind(C′)
ind(C&C′) = ind(C) ∧ ind(C′)
ind(C.C′) =


⊤, C = E ∧ ind(C′)
⊤, ind(C) ∧ C′ = E
⊥, otherwise
Figure 26. The ind function.
C. Auxiliary Functions
This section contains the full definitions of the four auxiliary func-
tions from section 7.2.3.
Definition 8 (Blank). A contract C is blank if LJCK = {ι}. The
function bl : C → {⊤,⊥} (Figure 24) checks if C is blank.
Lemma 8 (Blank). bl(C) = ⊤ ⇒ LJCK = ι
unv(@) = ⊥
unv(?) = ⊥
unv(r) = ⊥
unv(!r) = ⊥
unv(∅) = ⊥
unv(E) = ⊥
unv(C∗) = unv(C) ∨ ind(C)
unv(C+C′) = unv(C) ∨ unv(C′)
unv(C&C′) = unv(C) ∧ unv(C′)
unv(C.C′) =


⊤, C = E ∧ unv(C′)
⊤, unv(C) ∧ C′ = E
⊤, unv(C) ∧ unv(C′)
⊥, otherwise
Figure 27. The unv function.
Definition 9 (Empty). A contract C is empty if LJCK = ∅. The
function emp : C → {⊤,⊥} (Figure 25) checks if C is empty.
Lemma 9 (Empty). emp(C) = ⊤ ⇒ LJCK = ∅
Definition 10 (Indifferent). A contract C is indifferent if LJCK =
A. The function ind : C → {⊤,⊥} (Figure 26) checks if C is
indifferent.
Lemma 10 (Indifferent). ind(C) = ⊤ ⇒ LJCK = A
Definition 11 (Universal). A contract C is universal if LJCK = A∗.
The function unv : C → {⊤,⊥} (Figure 27) checks if C is
universal.
Lemma 11 (Universal). unv(C) = ⊤ ⇒ LJCK = A∗
D. Semantic containment
Proof of Lemma 3. A contract C is subset of another contract C′ iff
for all paths P ∈ LJCK the derivation of C′ w.r.t. path P is nullable.
For all P ∈ A∗ it holds that P ∈ LJC′K iff ν(∂P(C′)). It is trivial
to see that
C ⊑ C′ (16)
⇔LJCK ⊆ LJC′K (17)
⇔ ∀P ∈ LJCK : P ∈ LJCK (18)
⇔ ∀P ∈ LJCK : ν(∂P(C)) (19)
holds.
Proof of Lemma 4. A contract C is subset of another contract C′ iff
for all properties p in next(C) the derivation of C w.r.t. property p
is subset of the derivation of C′ w.r.t. p. By lemma 2 we obtain
LJ∂p(C)K = p
−1LJCK (20)
and this leads to
{E | ν(C)} ∪ {p.P | p ∈ next(C),P ∈ p−1LJCK} = LJCK (21)
Claim holds because
C ⊑ C′ (22)
⇔LJCK ⊆ LJC′K (23)
⇔ ∀P ∈ LJCK : P ∈ LJC′K (24)
⇔ E ∈ LJCK ⇒ E ∈ LJC′K ∧ (25)
∀p,P : p.P ∈ LJCK ⇒ ν(∂p.P(C
′)) (26)
⇔ ν(C)⇒ ν(C′) ∧ (27)
∀p ∈ next(C),∀P : p.P ∈ LJCK ⇒ ν(∂P(∂p(C
′))) (28)
⇔ ν(C)⇒ ν(C′) ∧ (29)
∀p ∈ next(C),∀P ∈ LJ∂p(C)K : ν(∂P(∂p(C
′))) (30)
⇔ ν(C)⇒ ν(C′) ∧ (31)
∀p ∈ next(C) : LJ∂p(C)K ⊆ LJ∂p(C
′)K (32)
⇔ ν(C)⇒ ν(C′) ∧ (33)
∀p ∈ next(C) : ∂p(C) ⊑ ∂p(C
′) (34)
E. Syntactic derivative
Proof of Lemma 5. ∀ℓ :
LJ∇ℓ(C)K ⊆
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C)K (35)
Proof by induction on C.
Case C = ∅: Claim holds because LJ∇ℓ(∅)K = LJ∂ℓ(∅)K = ∅.
Case C = E : Claim holds because LJ∇ℓ(E)K = LJ∂ℓ(E)K = ∅.
Case C = r:
Subcase ℓ ⊑r r: Claim holds because
LJ∇ℓ(r)K = LJ∂p(r)K = E | ∀p ∈ LJℓK.
Subcase ℓ 6⊑r r: Claim holds because LJ∇p(r)K = ∅.
Case C = C′∗: By induction
LJ∇ℓ(C
′)K
IH
⊆
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′)K (36)
holds.We obtain that
∀p : LJ∂p(C
′∗)K = LJ∂p(C
′).C′∗K (37)
∀ℓ : LJ∇ℓ(C
′∗)K = LJ∇ℓ(C
′).C′∗K (38)
holds. Claim holds because
∀ℓ : LJ∇ℓ(C
′∗)K (39)
= LJ∇ℓ(C
′).C′∗K (40)
IH
⊆ {P .P ′ | P ∈
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′)K,P ′ ∈ LJC′∗K} (41)
=
⋂
p∈LJℓK
{P .P ′ | P ∈ LJ∂p(C
′)K,P ′ ∈ LJC′∗K} (42)
=
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′∗)K (43)
Case C = C′+C′′: By induction
LJ∇ℓ(C
′)K
IH
⊆
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′)K (44)
LJ∇ℓ(C
′′)K
IH
⊆
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′′)K (45)
holds. We obtain that
LJ∂ℓ(C
′+C′′)K = LJ∂ℓ(C
′)K ∪ LJ∂ℓ(C
′′)K (46)
LJ∇ℓ(C
′+C′′)K = LJ∇ℓ(C
′)K ∪ LJ∇ℓ(C
′′)K (47)
holds. Claim holds because
LJ∇ℓ(C
′+C′′)K (48)
= LJ∇ℓ(C
′)K ∪ LJ∇ℓ(C
′′)K (49)
IH
⊆
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′)K ∪
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′′)K (50)
⊆
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′)K ∪ LJ∂p(C
′′)K (51)
=
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′+C′′)K (52)
Case C = C′&C′′: By induction
LJ∇ℓ(C
′)K
IH
⊆
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′)K (53)
LJ∇ℓ(C
′′)K
IH
⊆
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′′)K (54)
holds. We obtain that
LJ∂ℓ(C
′&C′′)K = LJ∂ℓ(C
′)K ∩ LJ∂ℓ(C
′′)K (55)
LJ∇ℓ(C
′&C′′)K = LJ∇ℓ(C
′)K ∩ LJ∇ℓ(C
′′)K (56)
holds. Claim holds because
LJ∇ℓ(C
′&C′′)K (57)
= LJ∇ℓ(C
′)K ∩ LJ∇ℓ(C
′′)K (58)
IH
⊆
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′)K ∩
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′′)K (59)
=
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′)K ∩ LJ∂p(C
′′)K (60)
=
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′&C′′)K (61)
Case C = C′.C′′: By induction
LJ∇ℓ(C
′)K
IH
⊆
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′)K (62)
LJ∇ℓ(C
′′)K
IH
⊆
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′′)K (63)
holds.
Subcase ν(C): We obtain that
∀p : LJ∂ℓ(C
′.C′′)K = LJ∂p(C
′).C′′K ∪ LJ∂p(C
′′)K (64)
∀ℓ : LJ∇ℓ(C
′.C′′)K = LJ∇ℓ(C
′).C′′K ∪ LJ∇ℓ(C
′′)K
(65)
holds. Claim holds because
LJ∇ℓ(C
′.C′′)K (66)
= LJ∇ℓ(C
′).C′′K ∪ LJ∇ℓ(C
′′)K (67)
IH
⊆ {P .P ′ | P ∈
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′)K,P ′ ∈ LJC′′K} (68)
∪
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′′)K (69)
⊆
⋂
p∈LJℓK
{P .P ′ | LJ∂p(C
′)K,P ′ ∈ LJC′′K} (70)
∪ LJ∂p(C
′′)K (71)
=
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′).C′′K ∪ LJ∂p(C
′′)K (72)
=
⋂
p∈LJℓK
∂p(C
′.C′′) (73)
Subcase ¬ν(C): We obtain that
∀p : LJ∂ℓ(C
′.C′′)K = LJ∂p(C
′).C′′K (74)
∀ℓ : LJ∇ℓ(C
′.C′′)K = LJ∇ℓ(C
′).C′′K (75)
holds. Claim holds because
LJ∇ℓ(C
′.C′′)K (76)
= LJ∇ℓ(C
′).C′′K (77)
IH
⊆ {P .P ′ | P ∈
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′)K,P ′ ∈ LJC′′K} (78)
=
⋂
p∈LJℓK
{P .P ′ | P ∈ LJ∂p(C
′)K,P ′ ∈ LJC′′K} (79)
=
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′).C′′K (80)
=
⋂
p∈LJℓK
∂p(C
′.C′′) (81)
Proof of Lemma 7. ∀ℓ ∈ first(C) :
LJ∇ℓ(C)K =
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C)K (82)
Suppose that ∀p, p′ ∈ LJℓK : ∂p(ℓ.C) = ∂p′(ℓ.C).
Proof by induction on C. The cases for ∅, E , r, C&C′ are
analogous to the cases in the proof of lemma 5. All occurences
of
IH
⊆ can be replaced by IH=.
Case C = C′+C′′: By induction
LJ∇ℓ(C
′)K
IH
=
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′)K (83)
LJ∇ℓ(C
′′)K
IH
=
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′′)K (84)
holds. We obtain that
LJ∂ℓ(C
′+C′′)K = LJ∂ℓ(C
′)K ∪ LJ∂ℓ(C
′′)K (85)
LJ∇ℓ(C
′+C′′)K = LJ∇ℓ(C
′)K ∪ LJ∇ℓ(C
′′)K (86)
holds. Claim holds because
LJ∇ℓ(C
′+C′′)K (87)
= LJ∇ℓ(C
′)K ∪ LJ∇ℓ(C
′′)K (88)
IH
=
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′)K ∪
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′′)K (89)
=
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′)K ∪ LJ∂p(C
′′)K (90)
=
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′+C′′)K (91)
Case C = C′.C′′: By induction
LJ∇ℓ(C
′)K
IH
=
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′)K (92)
LJ∇ℓ(C
′′)K
IH
=
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′′)K (93)
holds.
Subcase ν(C): We obtain that
∀p : LJ∂ℓ(C
′.C′′)K = LJ∂p(C
′).C′′K ∪ LJ∂p(C
′′)K (94)
∀ℓ : LJ∇ℓ(C
′.C′′)K = LJ∇ℓ(C
′).C′′K ∪ LJ∇ℓ(C
′′)K
(95)
holds. Claim holds because
LJ∇ℓ(C
′.C′′)K (96)
= LJ∇ℓ(C
′).C′′K ∪ LJ∇ℓ(C
′′)K (97)
IH
= {P .P | P ∈
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′)K,P ∈ LJC′′K} (98)
∪
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′′)K (99)
=
⋂
p∈LJℓK
{P .P | LJ∂p(C
′)K,P ∈ LJC′′K} (100)
∪ LJ∂p(C
′′)K (101)
=
⋂
p∈LJℓK
LJ∂p(C
′).C′′K ∪ LJ∂p(C
′′)K (102)
=
⋂
p∈LJℓK
∂p(C
′.C′′) (103)
Subcase ¬ν(C): Analogus to the case in the proof of lemma 5.
F. Syntactic containment
Before proving the syntactic containment we state an auxiliary
lemma. For simplification, the literals @, ?, and !r are collapsed
into a single regular expression literals r.
Lemma 12 (Path-preservation). ∀p,P:
P ∈ LJ∂p(C)K ⇒ ∃ℓ ∈ first(C) : P ∈ LJ∇ℓ(C)K (104)
Proof of Lemma 12. SupposeLJ∂p(C)K 6= ∅. Show ∃ℓ ∈ first(C) :
P ∈ LJ∇ℓ(C)K. Proof by induction on C.
Case C = ∅, first(C) = {∅}: Contradicts assumption.
Case C = E , first(C) = {}: Contradicts assumption.
Case C = r, first(C) = {r}:
We obtain that p ∈ LJrK ⇒ ∂p(r) = E . Claim holds because
first(C) = {r}, ∇r(r) = E , and thus P = ǫ and ǫ ∈ LJEK.
Case C = C′∗, first(C) = first(C′):
We obtain that P ∈ LJ∂p(C′∗)K = LJ∂p(C′).C′∗K 6= ∅. By
induction ∃ℓ′ ∈ first(C′) : P ′ ∈ LJ∇ℓ′(C′)K. The chain holds
because first(C′∗) = first(C′) and ∇ℓ(C′∗) = ∇ℓ(C′).C′∗ and
P ′ ∈ LJ∇ℓ(C
′)K,P ′′ ∈ LJ∇ℓ(C
′∗)K implies P = P ′.P ′′ ∈
LJ∇ℓ(C
′∗)K.
Case C = (C′+C′′), first(C) = first(C′) ∪ first(C′′):
We obtain thatP ∈ LJ∂p(C′+C′′)K = LJ∂p(C′)K∪LJ∂p(C′′)K 6=
∅. By induction ∃ℓ′ ∈ first(C′) : P ′ ∈ LJ∇ℓ′(C′)K and
∃ℓ′′ ∈ first(C′′) : P ′′ ∈ LJ∇ℓ′′(C
′′)K. The chain holds be-
cause first(C′+C′′) = first(C′) ∪ first(C′′) and ∇ℓ(C′+C′′) =
∇ℓ(C
′)+∇ℓ(C
′′) and P ∈ LJ∇ℓ(C′)K or P ∈ LJ∇ℓ(C′′)K
implies P ∈ LJ∇ℓ(C′+C′′)K.
Case C = (C′&C′′), first(C) = {ℓ′ ⊓r ℓ′′ | ℓ′ ∈ first(C′), ℓ′′ ∈
first(C′′)}:
We obtain that P ∈ LJ∂p(C′&C′′)K = LJ∂p(C′)K∩LJ∂p(C′′)K
implies P ∈ LJ∂p(C′)K and P ∈ LJ∂p(C′′)K. By induction
∃ℓ′ ∈ first(C′) : P ∈ LJ∇ℓ(C
′)K and ∃ℓ′′ ∈ first(C′′) : P ∈
LJ∇ℓ′′(C
′′)K. Let ℓ = ℓ′ ⊓r ℓ′′ ∈ first(C′&C′′). If p ∈ LJℓ′K
and p ∈ LJℓ′K then p ∈ LJℓK. The chain holds because
first(C′&C′′) = {ℓ′ ⊓r ℓ
′′ | ℓ′ ∈ first(C′), ℓ′′ ∈ first(C′′)}
and∇ℓ(C′&C′′) = ∇ℓ(C′)&∇ℓ(C′′), and P ∈ LJ∇ℓ(C′)K and
P ∈ LJ∇ℓ(C
′′)K implies P ∈ LJ∇ℓ(C′&C′′)K.
Case C = (C′.C′′):
Subcase ν(C′), first(C) = first(C′) ∪ first(C′′):
We obtain that P ∈ LJ∂p(C′.C′′)K = LJ∂p(C′).C′′K ∪
LJ∂p(C
′′)K implies P ∈ LJ∂p(C′).C′′K or P ∈ LJ∂p(C′′)K.
By induction ∃ℓ′ ∈ first(C′) : P ′ ∈ LJ∇ℓ(C′)K and ∃ℓ′′ ∈
first(C′′) : P ′′ ∈ LJ∇ℓ′′(C
′′)K. The chain holds because
first(C′.C′′) = first(C′) ∪ first(C′′) and ∇ℓ(C′.C′′) =
(∇ℓ(C
′).C′′)+∇ℓ(C
′′), and P ′ ∈ LJ∇ℓ(C′)K and P ′′ ∈
LJC′′K implies P = P ′.P ′′ ∈ LJ∇ℓ(C′.C′′)K or P =
ǫ.P ′′ ∈ LJ∇ℓ(C
′.C′′)K.
Subcase ¬ν(C′), first(C) = first(C′):
We obtain that P ∈ LJ∂p(C′.C′′)K = LJ∂p(C′).C′′K im-
pliesP ∈ LJ∂p(C′).C′′K. By induction ∃ℓ′ ∈ first(C′) : P ′ ∈
LJ∇ℓ(C
′)K. The chain holds because first(C′.C′′) = first(C′)
and ∇ℓ(C′.C′′) = ∇ℓ(C′).C′′, and P ′ ∈ LJ∇ℓ(C′)K and
P ′′ ∈ LJ∇ℓ(C
′′)K implies P = P ′.P ′′ ∈ LJ∇ℓ(C′.C′′)K.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof is by contraposition. If C 6⊑ C′ then
∃ℓ ∈ first(C) : ∇ℓ(C) 6⊑ ∇ℓ(C
′) or ¬(ν(C)⇒ ν(C′)).
We obtain that:
C 6⊑ C′ ⇔ LJCK * LJC′K (105)
⇔ ∃P ∈ LJCK\LJC′K (106)
Case P = ǫ:
Claim holds because ¬(ν(C)⇒ ν(C′)).
Case P 6= ǫ:
It must be that P = p.P ′ with p ∈ next(C) = LJfirst(C)K.
Therefore ∃ℓ ∈ first(C) : p ∈ LJℓK.
Subcase p /∈ next(C′):
Claim holds by Lemma 5 and 7 because ∃ℓ ∈ first(C) :
∇ℓ(C) 6= ∅ and ∇ℓ(C′) = ∅ implies that ∇ℓ(C) 6⊑ ∇ℓ(C′).
Subcase p ∈ next(C′):
By Lemma 5 and 7 claim holds because
P ′ ∈ LJ∂p(C)K\LJ∂p(C
′)K implies that
P ′ ∈ LJ∇ℓ(C)K\LJ∇ℓ(C
′)K
G. Correctness
Proof of Theorem 2. If Γ ⊢ C ⊑ C′ : ⊤ than C ⊑ C′ Proof is by
induction in the derivation of Γ ⊢ φ : {⊤,⊥}
Case (C-DELETE):
Obtaining the rule (C-UNFOLD-TRUE) and (C-UNFOLD-
FALSE) the result of φ = C ⊑ C′ is the conjunction of its
derivative w.r.t. the first literals. If φ ∈ Γ than φ is already part
of the conjunction.
Case (C-DISPROVE), (C-UNFOLD-TRUE); (C-UNFOLD-FALSE):
Claim holds by theorem 1
